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PLENARY NO LONGER: HOW THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT “AMENDED”
CONGRESSIONAL JURISDICTIONSTRIPPING POWER
Maggie McKinley*
This Note proposes a solution to the long-standing debate among federal
courts scholars as to where to draw the limits of congressional power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and to strip original jurisdiction from
the lower federal courts. Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the
possibility of limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power, the few
determinative cases to go before the Court reveal an acceptance of the orthodox
view of plenary power. Proponents of the orthodox view maintain that state
courts, bound to hear constitutional claims by their general jurisdictional grant
and to enforce the Constitution by the Supremacy Clause, would suffice as arbiters of federal constitutional rights. In contrast, this Note argues that ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment—which, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, implicitly amended the Eleventh Amendment—similarly
amended Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause, withdrawing Congress’s plenary jurisdiction-stripping power for claims brought to vindicate
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Through an analysis of original intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment,
this Note explores the undertheorized field of how amendments to the Constitution—an undoubtedly multigenerational text—alter the reach and meaning of the
original document. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, an often forgotten
second major framing generation, drafted and ratified the amendment just after
our country emerged from its bloodiest domestic war, long after the establishment of an extensive system of federal courts and during a time of great suspicion
of state forums. An examination of major Reconstruction Acts and their legisla-

* Law Clerk to the Honorable James Ware, Chief Judge of the Northern District of
California; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010. I am forever grateful to Janet Alexander for her
patient, thoughtful, and vigilant mentorship throughout the development of this topic and
beyond; to Pamela Karlan for profoundly helpful advice early on, as well as for as her endless ability to inspire; and to Michael Caesar, Mindy LeVu, Elisabeth Oppenheimer, and the
Stanford Law Review team for their comments and edits. Also, a very special thanks to my
Native American Law Students Association cohort and to the Redman family of the Wind
River Reservation for teaching me the most important lessons. Everything good in this Note
I attribute to those named above. All mistakes are my own.
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tive history, alongside a textual analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment that incorporates pragmatic context, reveals clear intent that ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment would necessarily limit any plenary jurisdiction-stripping
power vested in Congress at the Founding.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2011, Representative Ron Paul of Texas reintroduced the
Sanctity of Life Act of 2011.1 This was the fourth time Representative Paul had
introduced this bill to the House in the last six years.2 At each introduction the
content of the Sanctity of Life Act has remained the same. According to its
summary: “[H]uman life shall be deemed to exist from conception, without regard to race, sex, age, health, defect, or condition of dependency; and . . . the
term ‘person’ shall include all [such] human life . . . .”3 Moreover, the bill “recognizes that each State has the authority to protect lives of unborn children re-

1. H.R. 1096, 112th Cong. (2011).
2. See Sanctity of Life Act of 2009, H.R. 2533, 111th Cong. (2009); Sanctity of Life

Act of 2007, H.R. 2597, 110th Cong. (2007); Sanctity of Life Act of 2007, H.R. 1094, 110th
Cong. (2007); Sanctity of Life Act of 2005, H.R. 776, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Sanctity
of Life Act of 1995, H.R. 2087, 104th Cong. (1995) (same bill introduced by Representative
Steve Stockman).
3. H.R. 1096, § 2(b)(1)(A)-(B).
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siding in the jurisdiction of that State.”4 It may seem confusing that Representative Paul would expend any energy introducing a bill—numerous times, in
fact—that is in fundamental conflict with a well established federal right: the
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to an abortion, as defined in Roe v.
Wade5 and affirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.6 Should Congress pass the bill and should a state attempt to enact legislation pursuant to its new federal authority “to protect the lives of unborn children” by banning abortion in violation of Roe v. Wade, the state legislation
would be reviewed and overturned as unconstitutional, rendering Representative Paul’s efforts entirely futile. The answer to the puzzle of why Representative Paul would introduce such seemingly toothless legislation lies in the
second half of the bill. In addition to defining the point at which human life begins as at conception and granting states the authority to protect that life, the
bill also includes provisions to limit federal court jurisdiction:
Sec. 3. Limitation on Appellate Jurisdiction.
....
. . . [T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case arising out of any statute, ordinance,
rule, regulation, practice, or any part thereof, . . . on the grounds that such statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, practice, act, or part thereof—
(1) protects the rights of human persons between conception and birth; or
(2) prohibits, limits, or regulates—
(A) the performance of abortions; or
(B) the provision of public expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or
other assistance for the performance of abortions.
....
Sec. 4. Limitation on District Court Jurisdiction.
....
. . . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the district courts shall not
have jurisdiction of any case or question which the Supreme Court does not
have jurisdiction to review under section 1260 of this title.7

This provision invokes Congress’s power under Article III, Section 1,8 and
the Exceptions Clause9 to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts and the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, commonly known as “jurisdiction
stripping.” The bill transparently attempts to limit the federal due process right
to an abortion by endorsing state legislation in violation of that right and concurrently disallowing federal review to vindicate deprivation of that right.
Hypothetically, should such a bill become law, a claimant who wished to
challenge state legislation depriving her of her federal right to an abortion

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. § 2(b)(2).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
H.R. 1096, §§ 3-4.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1844549

MCKINLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (DO NOT DELETE)

1216

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

5/7/2011 2:57 PM

[Vol. 63:1213

would be barred from bringing a § 1983 claim—or other action—in federal
court. However, she would still be allowed access to a state forum. State courts,
like federal courts, are equally bound under the Supremacy Clause to apply all
federal law, including Supreme Court precedent. While these forums may differ
slightly in procedure and geography, the federal rights would presumably remain the same regardless of where the federal claim was brought. Yet, if these
forums are truly equal under the Supremacy Clause, why would Representative
Paul seek to introduce a bill that purports to limit a federal right by denying
access to a federal forum? The answer is simple. The proposed legislation capitalizes on the belief that a state court, with its deeper local attachments and accountability, might not continue to enforce the federal right in the absence of
federal review. If that belief is correct, without access to a lower federal court
or appellate review in the Supreme Court, claimants would be left without
access to a forum that would enforce their federal right against unconstitutional
state laws, allowing the unconstitutional laws to stand.10
In March of 2011, the Sanctity of Life Act of 2011 was referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary, where it will likely sit until expiration.11
This fourth effort at passage will likely be as unsuccessful as the first three. But
the question remains: is it possible that such a flagrant attempt at circumventing
federal rights could ever become law?
Under Article III, Section 1, Congress was designated with the power of
creating lower courts “from time to time”;12 and under Section 2, commonly
known as the Exceptions Clause, Congress was granted the right to create exceptions and regulations pertaining to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.13
The Supreme Court has yet to fully interpret this constitutional text and the
scope of its grant of congressional power to control federal jurisdiction. However, the orthodox view, sprouted primarily from the academy over the last forty years, has interpreted these provisions to mean that Congress’s power to strip
original jurisdiction from lower federal courts and appellate jurisdiction from
the Supreme Court is plenary and virtually limitless.14
This Note proposes one possible solution to the long-standing concern of
federal courts scholars as to where to draw the limits of congressional power to
strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and to strip original jurisdiction from the lower federal courts. Although the Supreme Court has rarely
addressed the possibility of limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping

10. Indeed, some studies have further shown that doubts over federal-state court parity
in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights may be valid. See Burt Neuborne, The
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
11. See Bill Summary & Status, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d112:H.R.1096:@@@L (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing the various referrals
of the bill in 2011).
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
13. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
14. See infra Part I.A.

MCKINLEY-63 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (DO NOT DELETE)

May 2011]

JURISDICTION-STRIPPING POWER

5/7/2011 2:57 PM

1217

power, the few determinative cases to go before the Court reveal an acceptance
of the orthodox view of plenary power.15 Proponents of this view maintain that
state courts, bound to hear constitutional claims by their general jurisdictional
grant and to enforce the Constitution by the Supremacy Clause, would suffice
as arbiters of federal constitutional rights. In his famous Dialogue analyzing jurisdiction stripping, Hart explains: “In the scheme of the Constitution, [the state
courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases
they may be the ultimate ones.”16 In response to an inquiry on whether the
Constitution would guarantee a federal forum for vindication of federal rights,
rather than leave the matter to a state forum, Hart exclaims:
It’s hard to see how the answer can be anything but no, in view of cases like
Sheldon v. Sill and Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., and in view of the language
and history of the Constitution itself. Congress seems to have plenary power to
limit federal jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings
to be brought, if at all, in a state court.17

In contrast, this Note argues that the Fourteenth Amendment—an undoubted alteration of the original document in many ways18—also amended
Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause, withdrawing Congress’s plenary power to strip jurisdiction from the lower federal courts and appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court over claims brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Through an analysis of the original intent behind the
Fourteenth Amendment, this Note explores the undertheorized field of how
amendments to the Constitution affect the meaning of the original document,19
15. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
16. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal

Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).
17. Id. at 1363-64 (footnotes omitted) (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441
(1850); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938)).
18. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit amendment
of the Eleventh Amendment and the principles of state sovereign immunity on which it
stands).
19. There is one exception to this dearth of scholarly exploration into constitutional
amendments’ effects on jurisdiction-stripping power, a 2008 article by Joseph Blocher exploring the First Amendment’s impact on the Exceptions Clause. See Joseph Blocher,
Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971, 1016-23 (2008). In his article,
Blocher invokes Akhil Amar’s notion of “intratextualism” to explore whether the First
Amendment may have implicitly amended the Exceptions Clause. Id. at 998, 1017. Most
importantly, through this analysis Blocher advocates for a “thickening [of] the understanding
of ‘external constraints’ more generally,” with deeper reflection on how later amendments
ought to impact interpretations of original constitutional text. Id. at 1003. In his First
Amendment analysis, Blocher argues that the same widely accepted implicit logical and textual connection between the First Amendment and Article I, limiting congressional power to
pass legislation in contravention of the right to freedom of speech, could extend to Article
III. See id. at 1017. The Exceptions Clause is an additional constitutional grant of legislative
power, and Blocher finds that the implicit First Amendment restriction on Article I legislative power would logically apply to all grants of legislative power throughout the Constitution. See id. This same analysis, Blocher posits, could be fruitful for future exploration into
other amendments and their impact on the Exceptions Clause. See id. at 1023.
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and through this analysis also defines the limits added by a second framing
generation to restrict the earlier broad grant of jurisdiction-stripping power.
Part I of this Note provides a short overview of the debate surrounding
Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power. Part I.A reviews the most commonly
held and broadly supported “orthodox view” that congressional jurisdictionstripping power is plenary. Part I.B reviews the two primary modifications to
the orthodox view suggested by the scholarly literature, internal and external
constraint theories. Finally, Part I.C explores external constraint theories derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly a theory proffered by Laurence Tribe.
Part II presents three arguments in support of the theory that the Fourteenth
Amendment amended Congress’s power to strip jurisdiction from the federal
courts, so that this power is no longer truly plenary. Part II.A presents an overview of how the Fourteenth Amendment has already been widely accepted as
implicitly amending other parts of the Constitution. In particular, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Eleventh Amendment in its assumed abrogation of state sovereign immunity and
broad shift of federal-state power.20 Part II.B describes the framing intent behind the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. This second major framing
generation drafted just after our country emerged from its bloodiest domestic
war, during Reconstruction, long after the establishment of an extensive system
of federal courts and during a time of great suspicion of state forums. Part II.C
presents a textual argument supporting the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended as a limit on Congress’s plenary power to entrust vindication of constitutional rights solely to state courts. By incorporating context
alongside the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part II.C argues that the framing generation assumed the availability of federal judicial oversight and intended the amendment as an obligation on both the legislature and judiciary to
oversee state action.

Yet Blocher finds the Fourteenth Amendment particularly problematic as a source for
Exceptions Clause amendment. In fact, his article “purposefully avoided using the Fourteenth Amendment as a point of departure” for several reasons. Id. First, it avoids concerns
over complications caused by the incorporation doctrine and how the doctrine would impact
analysis of an earlier amendment to the original Constitution. See id. Second, Blocher finds
troublesome the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment, with its dramatic expansion of congressional power under Section 5, could also serve as a limitation on congressional power
granted elsewhere in the Constitution. See id. at 1023-24. Third, the Fourteenth Amendment
also poses a textualist concern, in that the language used to grant rights is vague and ambiguous as contrasted with the clear and explicit grant to Congress to create exceptions to jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. See id. at 1024. As a consequence, Blocher argues
that the Fourteenth Amendment would be “susceptible to arguments that the clear language
of the Exceptions Clause must trump penumbras or emanations from elsewhere.” Id. Unlike
the Fourteenth Amendment, Blocher proposes, the First Amendment—presumably along
with others more like it—offers an example of specific text amending specific text. See id.
20. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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I. REVIEW
A. The Orthodox View
Under the traditional or orthodox view, congressional power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court and original jurisdiction from the lower federal courts is plenary. Article III grants Congress the power “from time to
time [to] ordain and establish” inferior federal courts.21 As the Constitution
provides that Congress’s decision to create lower federal courts is optional, the
orthodox view argues that the Framers therefore intended to leave the allotment
of jurisdiction over federal claims entirely in congressional hands. Should Congress choose to create lower federal courts and grant them jurisdiction over
such claims, then federal rights can be vindicated in a federal forum. However,
Congress could abstain from creating lower courts entirely, and leave protection of federal rights to state trial courts, without violating the Constitution.
Further, Article III describes the Supreme Court’s arising under appellate
jurisdiction as extending “both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”22 The power to create
“Exceptions” has been interpreted broadly by scholars of the orthodox view. As
Wechsler describes:
There is, to be sure, a school of thought that argues that ‘exceptions’ has a narrow meaning . . . . I see no basis for this view and think it antithetical to the
plan of the Constitution for the courts—which was quite simply that the Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution
should be used . . . .23

A plain text reading of Article III in isolation tends to support Wechsler’s interpretation. In the few cases on this issue that have gone before the Supreme
Court, the Court has nodded affirmatively toward the broad orthodox view of
the Exceptions Clause.24
Together, Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause have been interpreted as a broad grant of legislative power to withdraw the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction and both original and appellate jurisdiction from the lower federal courts.25 The orthodox view of plenary congressional power to strip
jurisdiction is limited only by the command of Marbury v. Madison that when
jurisdiction is exercised, the court must apply the Constitution.26

21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
23. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001,

1005 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
25. See Hart, supra note 16; Wechsler, supra note 23.
26. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding jurisdiction-stripping legislation unconstitutional on the grounds
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B. Modifications to the Orthodox View
The orthodox view has inspired extensive debate and commentary, a summary of which is far beyond the scope of this Note. But one particular line of
debate has engendered growing support. Scholars of this view argue that the
Constitution itself, either from within Article III or in the balance of the document, serves to constrain congressional power to pass and apply jurisdictionstripping legislation. This line of debate can be divided into two primary areas
of thought: internal constraint theorists, who propose that elements internal to
Article III serve to constrain jurisdiction-stripping power; and external constraint theorists, who propose that elements external to Article III located within the balance of the document serve to constrain Congress.
1. Internal constraint theories
Internal constraint theorists proffer restrictions on Article III jurisdictionstripping power inherent to the text of Article III. Two primary areas of thought
constitute the majority of internal constraint theories: first, a nontextual argument regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, termed the “essential functions” theory, proposing that the Exceptions Clause legislative power must not be so broad as to swallow Article III’s judicial architecture;27 and
second, a textual argument regarding lower federal court jurisdiction, developed by Justice Story and reinvigorated by Akhil Amar, proposing that the
framing intent behind the use of “all” in Article III implied that “all” claims
must be vested in the judiciary somewhere.28 While the Supreme Court has indicated some support of the orthodox view in the few jurisdiction-stripping
cases that have gone before it, it has yet to acknowledge either of the internal
constraint theories.
2. External constraint theories
External constraint theorists proffer that legislators and courts are still
bound to interpret and apply the balance of the Constitution even when exercising broad power under the Exceptions Clause and Article III. Theorists within
the external constraint camp are numerous.29 However, a strong theme has
that it based federal jurisdiction on the merits of the case, thus driving the outcome of the
decision).
27. See Hart, supra note 16.
28. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329-30 (1816); Akhil
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 238-42 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143 (1982);
Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of
Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45
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emerged within the scholarship. Specifically, external constraint theorists posit
that any jurisdiction-stripping legislation must be subject to the same constitutional limitations placed on any type of legislation: Congress must interpret the
Constitution to determine its power and limitations to enact legislation, and the
judiciary reviews the legislation and its application for violations of constitutional rights and principles.30 If the legislation, jurisdiction stripping or otherwise, violates another constitutional value—free speech, for instance—then it
would be deemed unconstitutional.
C. External Constraints and the Fourteenth Amendment
This Note is original in developing a theory that the Fourteenth Amendment amended or withdrew congressional jurisdiction-stripping power for
Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, a classic theory of external constraints on the plenary jurisdiction-stripping power also touched on the Fourteenth Amendment. Laurence Tribe is credited with establishing the most
broadly supported view of external constraints as derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment. Tribe argues that equal protection strict scrutiny should be applied
to any jurisdiction-stripping legislation where a statute has “specific rights . . .
singled out for special sacrifice.”31 Tribe’s concern is that unequal treatment of
particular federal rights “sends a clear signal to hostile state and local officials
and makes far more difficult the task of finding a neutral, close-fitting justification.”32
However, Tribe’s concern stops short of forbidding Congress to pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation that forecloses access to any federal forum for all
rights established by the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as Congress does not
selectively target certain rights for exclusion from federal forums.
This is not to say that Congress is necessarily compelled to provide federal
protection for fourteenth amendment rights. If Congress were to withdraw the
federal shield altogether or nearly so, repealing large segments of the corpus
of civil or criminal law that Congress had previously erected upon section 8 of
article I and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it seems unlikely that the
resulting jeopardy to any given right would be as great as in the case where
specific rights were singled out for special sacrifice.33

(1975); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority
to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
30. See Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 900, 916-22 (1982); Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 959, 981-84 (1982).
31. Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out
of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129, 145 (1981).
32. Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
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Unlike the Tribe view, this Note proposes that the Fourteenth Amendment,
in amending the Constitution, withdrew the plenary grant of congressional jurisdiction-stripping power. This withdrawal of legislative power would not
merely restrict congressional power in the traditional sense, as Tribe suggests,
by requiring that jurisdiction-stripping legislation be reviewed under the same
Fourteenth Amendment standards as other legislation. Rather, this Note proposes that after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would
overstep its constitutional legislative power if it disallowed a claimant access to
a federal forum—or federal review—to vindicate the deprivation of Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Unlike Tribe, this Note argues that Congress would not
merely be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment from passing legislation stripping jurisdiction targeting specific rights, but it would not be able to strip jurisdiction from federal forums at all for any right established by that amendment.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S LIMITATION ON CONGRESSIONAL
JURISDICTION-STRIPPING POWER
A. The Fourteenth Amendment’s “Implicit” Amendment
A threshold question is, of course, how the Fourteenth Amendment could
have amended the Exceptions Clause and Article III, Section 1, if the text of the
amendment makes no reference whatsoever to federal court jurisdiction. In accord with the principle that the genre of constitutional amendment usually calls
for concise drafting, many later amendments have been commonly accepted as
implicitly amending prior text. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is one
such example: Section 2 dictated that the number of congressmen assigned to a
state should be based on population statistics, “counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”34 In so doing, Section 2
implicitly amended Article I, Section 2, simply by overwriting its provision that
representatives should be apportioned based on population statistics that
counted free men as whole people, but counted slaves as three-fifths of a person.35 Another example of an implicit amendment involving the Fourteenth
Amendment, one recognized by the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,36
was the effect of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Eleventh
Amendment.
In Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Fourteenth
Amendment—and the shift of federal and state power inherent in its passage—
amended the Eleventh Amendment and the principles of state sovereign immunity for which it stands.37 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, wrestled

34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
See id. art. I, § 2.
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
See id. at 448.
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with the question of “whether, as against the shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment, Congress has the power to authorize federal courts to enter [money damages] against the State as a means of
enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”38 An earlier case, Edelman v. Jordan,39 had elaborated the contours of the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Second Circuit had held that Edelman meant that sovereign immunity would bar money damages against a state.40 The Court disagreed and reversed.41
Distinguishing Edelman, the Court held, was the fact that the present statute at issue (Title VII) was passed pursuant to Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation.42 “[As] intended by the Framers,” the Civil War Amendments functioned as an expansion of federal “general government” power with a “corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.”43 Thus, as described by the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment had “carved” the right to
immunity from suit pursuant to Section 5 legislation out of the states’ prior sovereign immunity.44
Consequently, the Court held “that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”45 The Section 5 enforcement power provided the means by which the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, “which themselves embody significant limitations
on state authority,” were legislatively enforced.46 Thus, when acting pursuant
to its Section 5 enforcement power, Congress could “provide for private suits
against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”47
The Fitzpatrick Court began to define the contours by which one amendment—particularly a transformative amendment—would come to limit the impact of an earlier amendment and the original constitutional document. This
second generation of framers, the Court found, did not merely alter the original
Constitution by appending particular text to the end of the document, but in fact

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (citation omitted).
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448.
See id.
See id. at 452-53.
Id. at 455 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1880)).
Id.
Id. at 456 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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altered earlier provisions and supplanted the framing intent behind them.48
While the literal text of the Fourteenth Amendment made no specific mention
of sovereign immunity or its intended impact on the Eleventh Amendment and
the original document, the Court still held that the logical impact of the states’
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War was a “corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.”49 And the Court
read this limit broadly to include diminution of sovereign immunity, in addition
to the limits on state police power that were a consequence of newfound federal
rights, despite the lack of any explicit textual reference.
This same logic extends to Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions
Clause. Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment also amended the original
constitutional document by reallocating power among the states, Congress, and
individuals, and effected similar limitations on congressional jurisdictionstripping power. The Fitzpatrick Court rightly focused on the specific impacts
of the “reach of congressional power” under Section 5, as the case before the
Court dealt with the constitutionality of federal remedial legislation passed to
protect Fourteenth Amendment rights.50 However, a review of the framing intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment reveals not merely the intent to expand
the enforcement power of Congress with Section 5 for the sake of expanding
the reach of the general government vis-à-vis the states, but the intent to empower the federal government to fulfill a newfound federal responsibility to
oversee state action that might run afoul of newfound Section 1 substantive
rights.51
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and Framing Intent
As the Fitzpatrick Court described, the Reconstruction Amendments,
passed in the wake of the Civil War, thoroughly restructured the federalist
framework architected at the Founding. These amendments, beginning with the
Thirteenth, “thus marked a radical break with the antebellum federal Constitution,”52 and justifiably so, as in between these two framing generations sat a
bloody war and a deeply divided nation. “What the bare text does not show is
the jagged gash between Amendments Twelve and Thirteen—a gash reflecting
the fact that the Founders’ Constitution failed in 1861-65. The system almost

48. See id. (“But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
49. Id. at 455 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-48 (1880)).
50. Id. at 447, 453.
51. As described in Part II.B, the framers envisioned a neutral federal forum for review of state action that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment as a primary vehicle
for federal oversight.
52. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 360 (2005).
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died, and more than half a million people did die.”53 This massive shift in context between framing generations also included a shift in perspective on states’
ability to enforce federal policy under the Supremacy Clause. New rights were
created and, moreover, a deep distrust of state institutions motivated the second
framing generation to couple these rights with protectionist jurisdictional grants
allowing suits to be brought, and removed, into federal forums.
The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, was ratified by the states on July
9, 1868.54 The amendment was enacted, in part, in response to a concern that
the Supreme Court would overturn the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as overstepping the Thirteenth Amendment’s newly created congressional enforcement
power.55 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment in turn,
focused on confronting the Black Codes and other Southern efforts to roll back
Reconstruction and reinvigorate the slave economy after the Civil War.56 This
Subpart describes the context in which the new framing generation drafted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ku Klux Klan
Act, arguing that these major congressional acts of Reconstruction were informed by and grounded in distrust of state action against private citizens and
state institutions’ ability to protect private citizens’ individual rights from harm.
As such, every congressional step to protect federal individual rights was
coupled with measures to vest protection of those rights in some federal institution or, at the very least, ensure federal oversight.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was entitled “An Act to protect all Persons in
the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication,”57 and included a broad grant of federal citizenship rights for all born
within the United States borders (except Native Americans) alongside two new
causes of action to enforce these newfound civil rights.58 Known today by 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, the Act granted private citizens broad rights to a “full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings” regardless of “race and color,”
including property rights and contract rights.59 Citizens of any color, the Act
stipulated, “shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States” as those “enjoyed by white citizens.”60 Further, the Act made it a mis-

53. Id.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
55. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL

PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988).
56. Id.
57. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
58. See id. §§ 1-3.
59. Id. § 1.
60. Id.
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demeanor for any person “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” to deprive a citizen of the rights granted by the Act.61
The 1866 Act also included two jurisdictional grants with which to enforce
these new rights, one to the lower federal courts and another to guarantee a final appeal to the Supreme Court. Section 3 of the Act provided:
That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts,
shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all
crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also,
concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil
and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts
or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights
secured to them by the first section of this act . . . .62

The grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, of course, presupposed
the existence of federal courts to which to grant jurisdiction; for this second
major framing generation, these lower courts were no doubt in existence.63 By
1866, Congress had exercised its optional power under Article III, Section 1, to
“from time to time ordain and establish” such inferior courts, so they were now
available. They were also necessary to give substance to the agenda of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing generation. The distrust of state institutional
ability to protect individual rights, not concern for national standardization,
prompted movement toward federalizing these individual rights. As Senator
Lane of Indiana described during the floor debates:
What are the objects sought to be accomplished by this bill? That these
freedmen shall be secured in the possession of all the rights, privileges, and
immunities of freemen; in other words, that we shall give effect to the proclamation of emancipation and to the constitutional amendment. How else, I ask
you, can we give them effect than by doing away with the slave codes of the
respective States where slavery was lately tolerated? One of the distinguished
Senators from Kentucky [Mr. Guthrie] says that all these slave laws have fallen with the emancipation of the slave. That, I doubt not, is true, and by a
court honestly constituted of able and upright lawyers, that exposition of the
constitutional amendment would obtain.
But why do we legislate upon this subject now? Simply because we fear
and have reason to fear that the emancipated slaves would not have their rights
in the courts of the slave States. The State courts already have jurisdiction of
every single question that we propose to give to the courts of the United
States. Why then the necessity of passing the law? Simply because we fear the
execution of these laws if left to the State courts. That is the necessity for this
provision.64

61. Id. § 2.
62. Id. § 3.
63. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Hotchkiss Amendment); infra Part II.C.7 (dis-

cussing the factual presupposition of lower federal courts on which the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment relied).
64. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 602 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lane) (alteration in original). There was also concern for the rights of Northern soldiers and retaliation
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Yet concerns remained over whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would
pass muster under a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court, and
legislators feared that it would be struck down for overstepping the Section 2
legislative enforcement grant of the Thirteenth Amendment.65 Many believed
that the protection of civil rights still rested within the province of each state,
even after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.66 In fact, “President Andrew Johnson vetoed the proposed act, in part, he contended, because the Constitution entrusted the protection of civil rights to the states.”67 Although Congress was able to overcome the veto, residual concerns motivated the framing
generation to take further steps to constitutionalize the spirit of the Civil Rights
Act,68 and with it federal protection of individual rights dependent on the assumption of an available federal forum and federal Supreme Court review.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment began its life in the “Bingham
Amendment” as the heart of the congressional grant of enforcement power.69
An early draft of the amendment proposed that Section 1 provide:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. IV, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).70

against them in Southern state courts. See, e.g., id. at 1526 (statement of Rep. McKee) (“This
[Act] simply protects them in the courts of the United States because the State courts have
refused and do refuse to give that protection to these men.”); id. at 1527 (statement of Rep.
Smith) (“When these Union officers were arrested and carried before the court at Alexandria,
they pleaded that they were only obeying orders emanating from the President of the United
States and officers in command over them. That the court overruled. The second plea they
made was that an appeal should be taken to the Federal court. The judge ruled that there was
but one appeal known in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and that was to the supreme court
of that State. They were therefore tried in that court. The jury, all of them secessionists, all of
them rebels, some of them having been in the rebel army, fined those men . . . . Now, sir, it is
for the protection of such men that this bill should be passed.”).
65. The Thirteenth Amendment focused on abolishing slavery, and did not explicitly
address individual rights: “Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
66. See NELSON, supra note 55, at 48.
67. Id.
68. See id. (“[T]he problems connected with the restoration of the South to the Union
and the protection of freedmen’s rights called for yet another constitutional amendment. . . .
Only some further constitutional change could resolve these matters in an acceptable way.”).
69. See id. at 49.
70. Id. at 50 (citing BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914)).
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Much of the analysis of Section 1 has focused on the ambiguous provisions
encapsulated in its grant of rights—“life, liberty, or property”; “equal protection”; and “privileges and immunities.”71 However, some interesting debate also surrounded the separation of “Congress shall have the power” from the grant
of new substantive rights, which was later drafted separately as the Section 1
“No State shall” grant of individual rights and the Section 5 congressional enforcement grant.72
At the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, on February 28, 1866,
Representative Giles W. Hotchkiss of New York proposed a change to the
drafted amendment.73 Rather than place all power to enforce these new citizenship rights into the hands of Congress, Hotchkiss wanted to secure the Fourteenth Amendment rights in a form that would not be dependent on mere legislation.74 As Representative Hotchkiss described:
Now, if the gentleman’s object is, as I have no doubt it is, to provide against a
discrimination to the injury or exclusion of any class of citizens in any State
from the privileges which other classes enjoy, the right should be incorporated
into the Constitution. It should be a constitutional right that cannot be wrested
from any class of citizens, or from the citizens of any State by mere legislation.75

To this end, Hotchkiss proposed a shift in the wording of Section 1’s grant
to secure these rights “by a constitutional amendment that legislation cannot
override,”76 rather than the Bingham draft that left enforcement of these rights
“to the caprice of Congress.”77 In place of Section 1’s “Congress shall have
power,” Hotchkiss proposed the amendment provide “that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a
part of the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment.”78 Representative Hotchkiss and others still believed
that the primary enforcement mechanism behind Section 1 rights would be legislative action taken under Section 5.
Now, I desire that the very privileges for which the gentleman is contending
shall be secured to the citizens; but I want them secured by a constitutional
amendment that legislation cannot override. Then if the gentleman wishes to
go further, and provide by laws of Congress for the enforcement of these
rights, I will go with him.79

71. See id. at 51.
72. See id. at 55.
73. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hot-

chkiss).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, Hotchkiss “wanted to be certain that the rights would be enforced by
the judiciary even if Congress fell under Democratic control.”80
It was the wording proposed by Representative Hotchkiss that was drafted
into Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which now provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.81

The first part of Section 1 constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866
grant of citizenship to all born within United States borders, overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott.82 The second part constitutionalized the
Hotchkiss proposal, removing the dependence of Fourteenth Amendment citizenship rights on congressional legislative action and allowing them to “stand
as a part of the organic law of the land.”83 The grant of legislative enforcement
power was relocated into Section 5, which now provides separately: “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”84
In accepting the “Hotchkiss Amendment,” the framing generation sought to
take the Fourteenth Amendment’s text a step beyond the mere clarification of
the power of Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This new text constitutionalized the rights and spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which itself
leaned heavily on the Act’s second goal: to provide a neutral federal forum in
which to enforce these new rights against state malfeasance and to ensure federal review of state court decisions addressing questions of federal constitutional rights.
The Fitzpatrick Court described Section 5’s impact on state power as a logical diminution of state sovereign immunity resulting inevitably from the enhancement of federal rights and federal enforcement of these rights.85 In a similar vein, Section 1, with its grant of rights that “stand as a part of the organic
law of the land,” would depend on the implicit assumption that federal review
and a federal forum would be available. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were well aware that Southern state courts had been, and could be
80. NELSON, supra note 55, at 55.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
82. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Notably, even the citizen-

ship grant of Section 1, intended to overrule Dred Scott, was a way, at least in part, to promote access to the federal courts. In the now-infamous decision of Dred Scott, the Court held
that the lower federal appellate court did not have jurisdiction to hear Dred Scott’s case,
since no descendant of a slave was a citizen for Article III purposes and, thus, no descendant
could bring suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 403-05.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
85. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
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in the future, one of the principal obstacles to the realization of equal rights for
African Americans. They knew that to make those rights real, enforcement
could not depend entirely on the state courts; a federal trial-level forum including federal Supreme Court review would have to be available. Section 1’s very
structure was adapted to prevent these rights from being stripped away at the
“caprice of Congress” should a Southern majority form in Congress following
the Southern states’ readmission to the Union. If the plenary jurisdictionstripping power remained unlimited after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then it would still have been left to the “caprice of Congress” to
frustrate enforcement of these rights by leaving them in the hands of Southern
state courts. It naturally follows that, to prevent such legislative caprice from
essentially eviscerating the new amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment must
have also amended Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause.
3. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
Three years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, commonly termed the Ku Klux Klan
Act.86 The Act was entitled “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.”87
Legislators proposed the Act at the first session of the Forty-Second Congress,
partly in response to a recent message from President Grant describing growing
racial unrest in the South after the Civil War:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life
and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the
revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some
localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is
beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt . . . .88

In addition to committing acts of private violence against newly freed
slaves, the Ku Klux Klan was also suspected of seizing control of many state
institutions.89

Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871) (statement of President Grant).
See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 579 (1871) (statement of Governor Holden) (“Unlike other secret political associations, they authorized the use of force, with deadly weapons, to influence the elections. . . . They were sworn to keep the secrets of the order,
to obey the commands of the chief, to go to the rescue of a member at all hazards, and to
swear for him as a witness, and acquit him as a juror. Consequently, grand juries in many
counties frequently refused to find bills against the members of this Klan for the gravest and
most flagrant violations of law; and when bills were found, and the parties were arraigned
for trial witnesses, members of the order, would in nearly every case come forward, and, taking an oath before the court on the Holy Evangelists to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, would swear falsely, and would thus defeat the ends of justice.”).
86.
87.
88.
89.
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The Ku Klux Klan Act was motivated by concern over capture of state institutions and the resulting inability to enforce the rule of law against racially
motivated violence and reclaim control of state social institutions. During floor
debates, Representative Coburn from Indiana explained:
Obviously the court of justice is the first instrument to be used in aid of the
fourteenth amendment . . . . Whenever, then, there is a denial of equal protection by the State, the courts of justice of the nation stand with open doors,
ready to receive and hear with impartial attention the complaints of those who
are denied redress elsewhere.90

These “courts of the nation” were a better forum to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights than state courts, according to Representative Coburn, because:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put under
terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so nearly identified with
those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or terror
more easily.91

Enacted on April 20, 1871, the Act codified the new post-Civil War framing generation’s distrust of state institutions by providing a private cause of action against state actors for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the Act provided:
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .92

Moreover, this distrust did not stop at state enforcement and legislative institutions; it extended fully into distrust of state courts’ ability to apply state
laws equally and in accord with federal constitutional rights as directed by the
Supremacy Clause. The Act included a jurisdictional grant to the lower federal
courts, which at the time lacked general federal question jurisdiction and were
dependent entirely upon specific jurisdictional grants from Congress.93 The jurisdictional grant allowed claims brought to vindicate the deprivation of federal
constitutional rights “to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of
the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon
error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts.”94

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1871) (statement of Rep. Coburn).
Id. at 460.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
See id.
Id.
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Through the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act, the general government
fulfilled—at least in part—its responsibility to ensure that Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Supremacy Clause, would remain meaningful in the face of state defiance. While the original framing generation of
1787 may have believed that the state courts would function as proper enforcers
of federal law, leaving lower federal courts as an optional creation for Congress, the framing generation of 1868 drafted in a very different world. As described, the intent and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment, like most amendments, was not merely to append rights and powers to the Constitution, which
otherwise would simply remain unchanged. Rather, the amendment necessarily
altered the reach and meaning of several portions of the original document.95
The framers intended a similar alteration of Article III, Section 1, which considered the existence of lower federal courts optional, and the Exceptions Clause,
which had previously allowed Congress to entrust state courts with the final arbitration of federal rights.
C. A (Con)textualist Analysis
1.

An intertextualist interpretive framework96

There is also a textualist argument to be made in support of the Fourteenth
Amendment amending congressional jurisdiction-stripping power. In his recent
article, Joseph Blocher proposes a textualist approach in determining the effect
of the First Amendment on the Exceptions Clause.97 In particular, Blocher selects Akhil Amar’s intratextualist framework98 as his interpretive tool of
choice.99 Yet Blocher also concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment presents
a challenging example for limitations on congressional jurisdiction-stripping
power when applying a textualist approach.100 However, this conclusion could
merely be a result of an improper fit between Amar’s intratextualist framework
and amendments added much later than the First Amendment.
Amar’s intratextualism proposes a method of constitutional interpretation
that uses the document as a whole to derive the meaning of particular words
and phrases.101 His theory advises that, rather than attempting to derive meaning from isolated words or phrases at issue in a particular case, an interpreter
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. While intertextuality is the subject of significant academic discourse in the literary

theory community, it is used here as a purely legal metaphor. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW
LITERATURE 285 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that the “legal and literary-theoretical concepts
of intertextuality have nothing in common but the word”).
97. See Blocher, supra note 19, at 997-98; see also supra note 19.
98. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
99. See Blocher, supra note 19, at 998.
100. See id. at 1023-24.
101. See Amar, supra note 98, at 791-94.

AND
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should sift through the entire Constitution to define word use from use in similar phrases, and should seek out patterns and principles from similar drafting
within the document.102 However, Amar himself acknowledged the weaknesses
of intratextualism when used as a solitary interpretive method and introduced it
as merely another tool for the interpretive toolbox.103 In particular, Amar found
the method an improper fit for the interpretation of clauses that may present
such commonalities on their face as to appear in pari materia, yet when
changed circumstances between the two clauses may have rendered their meanings very different.104 “Paired against the notion that the same words should
mean the same thing (e.g., ‘shall be vested’) is the idea that sometimes the
same words should mean different things because the overall context of two
clauses is different (e.g., chameleon words).”105 Amar writes that without the
added benefit of complementary interpretive methods, intratextualism “may be
too self-referential, even autistic”106 and might fail to shed light on “intertextual links to other documents.”107
Rather, interpretation of constitutional clauses that span diverse contexts
might be better served by an interpretive theory that incorporates context and
thereby pragmatic meaning. Such an interpretive method can be found in the
heart of Lawrence Lessig’s translation theory,108 which introduced the linguistic field of pragmatics as a way of understanding constitutional text.109 As LesSee id.
See id. at 799-802.
See id.
Id. at 801 n.203.
Id. at 799. Autism, often referred to as a semantic-pragmatic disorder, is an apt metaphor for an interpretive method that focuses narrowly on the semantic content of a particular text and struggles with the contextualized or pragmatic connotations of a text. Cf. Soile
Loukusa & Irma Moilanen, Pragmatic Inference Abilities in Individuals with Asperger Syndrome or High-Functioning Autism, 3 RES. AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 890 (2009); Elinor Ochs & Olga Solomon, Practical Logic and Autism, in A COMPANION TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 140 (Conerly Casey & Robert Edgerton eds., 2004).
107. Amar, supra note 98, at 799.
108. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (outlining an interpretive theory that changed readings of constitutional text could remain faithful
to the original meaning of the text, should an interpreter translate the original meaning in
accord with circumstances that may have changed since the time of drafting). Translation
theory provides a rare “progressive originalism,” as it synthesizes fidelity to framing intent
with support for the most celebrated Warren Court decisions. In so doing, translation theory
proffers one of the most plausible answers to the most vexing problem in constitutional interpretation: how to justify changed readings of fixed text over time without allowing the
interpreter unbridled discretion to alter meaning. In this case, the theory is equally helpful in
explaining changed readings between texts that have changed over time (here, amendments
to the Constitution), and affords insight into how originalism could incorporate multiple layers of framing intent.
109. Lessig first introduced the importance of context, the pivotal question of the field
of pragmatics, to the interpretation of constitutional text in his first publication on the subject. See Lawrence Lessig, Plastics: Unger and Ackerman on Transformation, 98 YALE L.J.
1173, 1174-75 (1989) [hereinafter Lessig, Plastics]. However, Lessig’s acknowledgement of
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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sig instructed, a constitutional interpreter should never ignore context.110 “Between two moments of time, contextuality tutors us to track both the change in
the token and the change in the context, so as to track the change in meaning.”111
However, the crux of such a contextualized method is the same struggle
that defines the entire field of pragmatics: what ought to constitute “context”112
within such an intertextual method? While Lessig’s definition of “context” is
often drawn with a broad brush and is, at times, internally inconsistent,113 some
aspects are instructive here. Generally, Lessig defines “context” from the perspective of the author as “just that range of facts, or values, or assumptions, or
structures, or patterns of thought that are relevant to an author’s use of words to
convey meaning.”114 Within the definition of “context,” Lessig defines a subcategory of the most significant contextual elements or “presuppositions,”
which are “not just relevant to an author’s use, but are indeed relied upon by
the author when using the text—relied upon in just the sense that had they been
other than they were when the author first used these words, then the author
would have used words other than she did.”115 Presuppositions could be factual, including the economic and technological reality of the time, as well as

the field of pragmatics came much later. See Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability:
Responses to Responding to Imperfection, 74 TEX. L. REV. 839, 843 (1996).
110. See Lessig, Plastics, supra note 109, at 1176-77.
111. Id. at 1177.
112. “Context” is an important analytical notion at the heart of the linguistic field of
pragmatics that was first introduced in 1923 by anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. See
Bronislaw Malinowski, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, in THE MEANING
OF MEANING 306 (John Constable ed., Routledge 2001) (1923). Malinowski proposed that
language itself could not be understood without taking into consideration the larger sociocultural frameworks within which the language was communicated. Id. at 313. Further, Malinowski put forth the idea that language should be understood as something broader than its
semantic content and should, instead, be studied as a mode of practical action embedded
within activities. Id. at 325-26. The notion of context has been developed extensively since
Malinowski’s introduction by theorists such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, who used context as a
centerpiece for his “language games,” as well as by a long line of sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1, 11
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968) (“Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring
into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of
life.”).
113. Compare Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 412 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Theory] (describing context as something cognitively recognized, but merely socially accepted “when one
person’s questions about it do not raise questions in the minds of others”), with Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 973-74 (1995) (analogizing context to Bourdieu’s practice theory or habitus).
114. Lessig, supra note 108, at 1178.
115. Id. at 1179-80 (emphasis omitted).
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legal, primarily the current state of the doctrine.116 Yet without the author
present to clarify which facts she relied upon—as is the case with past framing
generations—this definition of context is challenging to operationalize within
an interpretive method.
For a more specific definition of context and pragmatic meaning, we must
return to the field of pragmatics itself,117 and particularly “ethnopragmatics” as
developed by linguistic anthropologist Alessandro Duranti.118 Much like Lessig’s definition of context, ethnopragmatics takes as a starting point the perspective of the participants.119 Further, ethnopragmatics modifies the more traditional field of pragmatics, “the study of the relationship between linguistic
expressions and certain aspects of the context of their use,”120 with an empirical understanding of how language and meaning are local and embedded within
activities.121 Thus, any definition of context, which we use to make sense of the
texts of others, “must take the lead from the way the participants themselves
chose to do it.”122
Although ethnopragmatics was primarily designed to study “talk-inaction,”123 some dimensions of context are equally applicable (or adaptable) to
textual interpretation. The first dimension is focusing analysis on the perspective of the participants themselves.124 This perspective could be captured either
through firsthand reports regarding the particular text and the broader practices
and values surrounding the text, or through “contextualization cues,”125 cues
used by the participants to highlight the particular context or frame within
116. See Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 113, at 453-72 (explaining the
changed readings of the Constitution around the time of the New Deal as a consequence of
changed factual and legal context).
117. Specifically, the field of so-called neo-Gricean pragmatics is particularly suited for
an interpretive theory, as it would incorporate Amar’s intratextualist method of interpreting
semantic meaning or “sentence-meaning” alongside other levels of meaning, including
“speaker-meaning” or “utterance-token[]” meaning and “utterance-type[]” meaning. See
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 17-19 (1983).
118. See ALESSANDRO DURANTI, FROM GRAMMAR TO POLITICS 11 (1994).
119. See id. at 168-69.
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 167.
122. Id. at 169.
123. See id. at 11 (noting that primary methods should be ethnographic in order to analyze speech).
124. See Charles Goodwin & Alessandro Duranti, Introduction to RETHINKING
CONTEXT 1, 4 (Alessandro Duranti & Charles Goodwin eds., 1992) (“What analysts seek to
describe is not what they consider context, for example their map of the city in which the
blind man finds himself, but rather how the subject himself attends to and organizes his perception of the events and situations that he is navigating through.”).
125. See John J. Gumperz, Contextualization Conventions, in SOCIOLINGUISTICS 139,
140 (Christina Bratt Paulston & G. Richard Tucker eds., 2003) (describing contextualization
cues as the “constellations of surface features of message form” that are “the means by
which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to
be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows”).
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which an activity is taking place for each other.126 The second dimension is the
larger setting and activity within which the text is embedded (e.g., legislating in
a representative democracy or amending the Constitution).127 “[A]s a coin can
mean one thing when offered to a storekeeper after taking a candy bar, and
quite another when used to replace a missing piece in a game of checkers, so
the same utterance can mean quite different things when it is embedded within
different natural activities.”128 The third dimension is the behavioral environment of the text or how attention is organized around the text, which could include the layout of the text and how the text is used.129 The fourth dimension is
the features of the text itself that are not properly described as semantic, such as
the genre to which the text belongs (e.g., fiction, nonfiction, a menu in restaurant, the Bible).130 Last is the extrasituational context of the text, including the
larger sociocultural, geographic, and temporal context in which the text was
created and intended to be read and applied.131 This latter aspect of context is
generally identified, for speech at least, through “ethnographic methods that
could give us the richest documentation of the on-going situation and its temporal and spatial surroundings.”132
2. Intertextualism and constitutional amendment
Shifted context between constitutional amendments and the original text
can be thought of as a function of the likelihood of changed circumstances simplified as time. The greater the amount of time between the original text’s drafting and when amendments were ratified, the greater the chances for changed
meaning between two tokens—words or phrases—that may appear similar on
their faces, and the greater the need to contextualize an interpretation of the
text. For example, these two phrases may look identical devoid of context:
“That’s great” and “That’s great.” However, the meaning behind the phrases
can shift wildly based on context. If, one evening, a woman takes a bite of her
dinner and says “That’s great,” we know that she means to affirmatively express her enjoyment of the food. However, if the same woman, running late for
work the next morning, walks out to her car and notices she has a flat tire, her
“That’s great” can take on a very different meaning. The more time that has
passed between utterances (or clauses), the more likely it is that the context has

See Goodwin & Duranti, supra note 124, at 6-7.
See id.
Id. at 16-17.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 7-8.
See id. at 8-9.
ALESSANDRO DURANTI, LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 272 (1997). Equally applicable is anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick description.” See CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 3 (1973).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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shifted between texts and the greater the chance of misinterpreting meaning if
text is analyzed without context.
Further, a later-added amendment could actually serve to implicitly transform earlier constitutional text. This process in interpretive theory is known as
“synthesis.”133 When interpreting a “multigenerational text”134 like the U.S.
Constitution, synthesis requires that “[l]ater parts . . . must be synthesized with
earlier parts, and this synthesis can change the reading of what went before.”135
An example of synthesis can be found in the sister case to Brown v. Board of
Education.136 In Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause equally limited the federal government’s segregation of public schools through the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause.137 In so doing, the Court found that the changed reading of the Fifth
Amendment was not a consequence of changed text. Nowhere did the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment address public school segregation in the District
of Columbia. Rather, “what Bolling describes is a changed reading that . . .
must turn on implications drawn indirectly from a changed text.”138
In his article, Blocher applies Amar’s intratextualist framework aptly to the
First Amendment, added just a few short years after the original document’s
drafting.139 However, Amar himself writes of the “jagged gash between
Amendments Twelve and Thirteen,” a gash that the “bare text” of the Constitution does not reveal.140 The Fourteenth Amendment, as a Reconstruction
Amendment, is paradigmatic of changed context from the original document,
demanding not only a comparison of word use intratextually, but an examination of word use within a dramatically altered context, intertextually. An intertextual interpretive method for such amendments would take into consideration
the contextual distance between these texts when attempting to derive meaning
from particular words or phrases used in separate parts of the document, and
when discerning patterns and principles from highly disparate portions of the
Constitution.
3. The extrasituational context of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment’s framing generation, as described above,
drafted and ratified at a time of deep distrust of state institutions, including state
courts. In 1866, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine included a report by General
133. See Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 113, at 408 (“Within a tradition of
written constitutions, a question of synthesis gets raised with every amendment.”).
134. Id. at 443.
135. Id. at 408.
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
138. Lessig, Fidelity and Theory, supra note 113, at 410.
139. See Blocher, supra note 19, at 997-99.
140. AMAR, supra note 52, at 360.
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Terry, a Unionist, about relations in Virginia after the Civil War.141 General
Terry reported that “[t]he feeling on the part of Secessionists toward Unionists,
whether Virginians or from other States, is hostile. . . . I do not think Unionists
are secure in the enjoyment of their rights in a Secession community; they
could not rely upon the State Courts for justice.”142 The attitude toward newly
freed slaves was no better. General Terry warned that the military should not
withdraw, otherwise the freedmen “would not receive from the people or from
the courts protection for their rights of person and property, and they would be
persecuted through the machinery of the courts as well as privately.”143 Recalcitrance by state institutions was rampant, especially in their treatment of African Americans.144 It was in the context of this distrust and the availability of
federal forums to enforce federal policies that the Fourteenth Amendment’s text
was drafted and ratified.
4. Contextualization cues of the Fourteenth Amendment
Another method of capturing the relevant context for particular texts is to
identify ways in which the participants, both drafters and ratifiers, mark the
contextual frame within which they intend the text to be interpreted.145 One
such contextualization cue used by participants is to mark the text as intended
for a particular audience. For example, if a father writes a letter to his child at
college, telling the child to stop staying out late, we understand the father to
mean that the child should exercise self-control. However, if the same father
wrote a letter to the child’s dormitory manager, informing the manager that the
child should stop staying out late, we understand the father to intend to impart
an obligation on the manager to oversee the child, as well as intending the child
to obey. The father’s intentions are rendered all the more plain if it is well
known that the child has frequently disobeyed and the father does not trust the
child to comply.
As applied to the Fourteenth Amendment and its effect on the congressional grants of jurisdiction-stripping power embodied in the Exceptions Clause and
Article III, Section 1, an intertextualist interpretation would begin by noting a
distinct contextualization cue inherent in the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment, one much more salient in 1868 than 1787: that the U.S. Constitution is an inherently federal document. It is, in effect, a letter to the federal government, more akin to the father’s letter to the dormitory manager rather than to
the child. As a document created to architect the powers and responsibilities of

141. Monthly Record of Current Events, 32 HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG. 805, 808

(1866).
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 125.
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the federal government, drafting an amendment including the Section 1 text
“No State shall” and “nor shall any State” bears a very distinct meaning—
unlike if the same phrase were drafted into a state constitution. Hypothetically,
and presumably with some assistance from the Guarantee Clause,146 the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment could have attempted to draft a provision
obligating states to include the Section 1 language—barring violation of individual rights—into their own state constitutions. But the Reconstruction framing generation decided instead to direct the states through a federal document,
creating a parallel obligation of federal oversight of individual rights. Of course
the amendment addressed the states and prohibited violative state action
through the Supremacy Clause; however, it also added to the responsibilities of
the federal government to ensure that “[n]o State shall” burden those newfound
federal rights.
5. Prior texts: the Bingham Amendment
An intertextual interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would also
take into consideration the impact of prior texts, particularly prior texts considered and rejected by the drafters of that clause. In this case, the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment drafted the phrase “No State shall” into a separate section from the Section 5 grant of congressional enforcement power, in a form
that appears “self-executing.”147 This distinctive drafting, read against the
background of the original 1787 framing context—in which the Framers intentionally structured the document to architect a limited federal government and
preserve residual states’ rights—could be read to mean that this second generation of framers merely intended the amendment to restrict state action in violation of the U.S. Constitution through the Supremacy Clause. However, this is
where the change in context of an intertextual analysis becomes important. This
phrase was drafted, and intentionally phrased as self-executing, at a time where
distrust of state institutions’ willingness to follow federal directives was at its
peak. Representative Bingham, when introducing the original amendment draft,
described the necessity of the Fourteenth Amendment to the process of reconstruction in this era of deep distrust.148 Bingham warned that “some [state] officials would violate their oaths as they have heretofore done and clothe themselves with perjury as with a garment in order to sweep away the rights of loyal
men.”149 He acknowledged that the army had successfully kept the Southern
states in check thus far, but expressed deep concern that this would not be suf146. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
147. See supra Part II.B.2 (addressing the Hotchkiss Amendment).
148. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bing-

ham); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (“As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, are self-executing.”).
149. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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ficient when the states were brought back into the Union.150 “But the point I
desire to make clear is, that unless you put them in terror of the power of your
laws, made efficient by the solemn act of the whole people . . . , they may defy
your restricted legislative power when reconstructed . . . .”151
The post-Civil War framing generation intended the amendment to have
force against defiant state institutions and retain force if Southern states were to
seize Congress once reconstructed—and logically so. If states were already rejecting the Supremacy Clause’s command to apply federal law to such a degree
that the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 required protectionist federal jurisdiction
grants, then the mere drafting of the same rights into a constitutional amendment—without the coextensive federal jurisdiction grants—would be no more
helpful. The rights would still be left to the “caprice of Congress” to withdraw
if Congress retained the power to foreclose all manner of federal court review.
As Representative Hotchkiss described, the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily
established “a constitutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens, or from the citizens of any State by mere legislation.”152 To this end, the
Fourteenth Amendment must have also necessarily amended Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause grants of plenary legislative jurisdictionstripping power, power that would wrest these rights from citizens by “mere
legislation.”
6. Shifted context, shifted meaning: “No State shall”
As Amar noted, an intratextual reading that focuses too narrowly on semantic meaning could often mistakenly correlate clauses that appear identical
on their faces to the detriment of a potentially more accurate interpretation that
includes an understanding of pragmatic meaning.153 With an intertextual reading, even clauses that appeared on their face as in pari materia could be read as
having distinct meanings should the context behind the two clauses have
shifted between draftings. As previously outlined here, the difference in context
between earlier constitutional text and the Fourteenth Amendment was vast.
Particularly, in the context in which the amendment was drafted, if Congress
retained full power under the Exceptions Clause and Article III, Section 1, to
strip lower court jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, it
would have the ability to immediately render the prohibitive language of “No
State shall” effectively toothless. Not only does this reading violate one of the
central interpretive canons dictating that a plain meaning reading not render
portions of the text meaningless, it would also leave this second highly transformative framing generation—one that was deeply concerned that Fourteenth

150.
151.
152.
153.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss).
See Amar, supra note 98, at 799-801.
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Amendment substantive rights withstand congressional caprice154—looking
rather silly. An Amar-derived intratextual reading of the phrase “No State
shall” against other seemingly identical uses of “No State shall”—as found in
Article I, Section 10155—and similar methods of addressing constitutional obligations to a particular entity elsewhere in the Constitution—“Congress shall
pass no law,” for instance—would argue that it merely placed an obligation on
the states through the Supremacy Clause. However, the first generation of framers drafted at a time without the same distrust of state institutions, and when
the U.S. Constitution was focused on merely defining the contours of the federal government.
In contrast, an intertextual reading of the directive “No State shall,” with
the background of deep suspicion toward the willingness of states to implement
federal policy, renders the meaning of this particular directive quite different.
The Fourteenth Amendment directive of “No State shall” must be read against
the suspicion of state institutions at the time of drafting. The framers, distrustful
of the ability of the states to enforce federal policy, intended the phrase “No
State shall” as a directive toward the federal government to police state action
for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. This policing would only have
been secured through an amendment of Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power. Without such a limitation, Congress could strip away the force of the Fourteenth Amendment and render its command of “No State shall” effectively
meaningless by leaving the enforcement of such rights to hostile state courts.
7. The factual presupposition of lower federal courts
Finally, an intertextual interpretation would incorporate the background
factual context that the drafters and ratifiers took for granted when formulating
a constitutional clause. This is salient in the particular context of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s drafting era. Article III, Section 1, states that “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”156
which has been interpreted within the orthodox view to mean that the Framers
intended to give Congress the choice of whether to create lower federal courts
and, accordingly, to give Congress unfettered power over their jurisdiction.157
However, the orthodox view neglects the factual presuppositions that this later
Fourteenth Amendment framing generation took for granted. Specifically, during their time, lower federal courts were already in existence. Congress had ex154. See supra Part II.B.2.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3. Arguably, a reading of earlier clauses, including

these earlier-drafted clauses of “No State shall,” could be affected by synthesis in that, following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, these earlier clauses could have been
“amended” to reflect the distrustful gloss laid over the latter “No State shall.”
156. Id. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
157. See supra Part I.A.
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ercised its option to create these courts, on which it heavily relied to implement
and enforce federal civil rights policy.158 Without them, the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act would have been empty policy against the
Southern states. It is against this presupposed factual reality that this second
generation of framers amended the Constitution and enacted a huge shift in the
federal-state balance of power. Without these taken-for-granted federal forums,
the newly established rights in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have been rendered meaningless.
Consequently, the existence and availability of lower federal courts at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting should be treated as a “factual
presupposition” of the framing generation. That presupposition implies that,
had the facts been different at the time of drafting, the framing generation
would have drafted a different, more functional Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
This Note proposes a new strain of external constraint theory: that the
Fourteenth Amendment limited the broad grant of congressional jurisdictionstripping power under Article III, Section 1, and the Exceptions Clause. Unlike
the orthodox view of Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping power, a theory that the
Fourteenth Amendment amended congressional jurisdiction-stripping power
would place clear limits on a power now theorized as plenary. This approach is
distinct from prior external constraint theories in that it argues for a complete
removal of congressional power to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation denying a federal forum and federal review for rights granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than a mere review of the jurisdiction-stripping legislation
for constitutional compliance.
This theory would inevitably result in legislation like the Sanctity of Life
Act of 2011159 being deemed an unconstitutional overstep of Congress’s legislative powers, which the Fourteenth Amendment has limited. Indeed, this limitation would serve the same function today as the framers intended it serve at
the time of ratification: it would provide a neutral federal forum and federal review of state action that violates citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. And,
as Representative Paul’s efforts have illustrated, the belief that state courts
might not enforce these rights in the absence of federal review is still very real
over a hundred years later.
The orthodox view has too long based its expansive view of jurisdictionstripping power solely on the original intent behind the Exceptions Clause and

158. See supra Part II.B; see also EVERETTE SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE KU KLUX
KLAN 195 (1987) (“By the end of 1870, 271 enforcement cases were pending in southern
district and circuit courts; this increased to 879 in 1871, to 1,890 in 1872, and to 1,960 in
1873.”).
159. H.R. 1096, 112th Cong. (2011).
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Article III, Section 1, despite extensive modifications to the Constitution over
the last two hundred years. Ignoring the impact of these later amendments inevitably leads to an overly simplistic view, incorporating solely the intent of the
original framing generation to the exclusion of later, highly transformative,
framing generations and the contexts in which they drafted. This Note presents
a possible theory by which the limits of this power can finally be ascertained.
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